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The probability of nontrivial common knowledge

Collevecchio, Andrea; LiCalzi, Marco - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 556-570

We study the probability that two or more agents can attain common knowledge of nontrivial events when the size of the state space grows large. We adopt the standard epistemic model where the knowledge of an agent is represented by a partition of the state space. Each agent is endowed with a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049728

Admissibility and event-rationality

Barelli, Paulo; Galanis, Spyros - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 21-40

lexicographic beliefs to capture infinitely less likely conjectures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide … among strategies that are outcome-equivalent given their conjectures. A player is event-rational if she best responds to a … type spaces to capture interactive beliefs, we show that event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049856

Network games under strategic complementarities

Belhaj, Mohamed; Bramoullé, Yann; Deroïan, Frédéric - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 310-319

We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from above. We first derive new sufficient conditions for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117134

Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences

Hernández, Penélope; Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 56-66

In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049725

Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 898-920

This paper experimentally analyzes the effect of network structures on individualsʼ decisions in a game of strategic substitutes. The theoretical basis for our experiment is the model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). As predicted, we find that individuals are able to coordinate on equilibria,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049842

Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Ott, Marion - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 35-52

We conduct an experiment in continuous time: every subject can change her links to others and her action in a Hawk–Dove game, which she plays bilaterally with each of her linked partners, at any time. We hypothesize that norms exist regarding who establishes and thus pays for links, and that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049851

Stochastic stability in best shot network games

Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 538-554

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations – i.e., possible mistakes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577244

Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality

Perea, Andrés - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 231-254

opponents will choose rationally in the future. This is the basis for the concept of common belief in future rationality, which … precisely those strategies that can rationally be chosen under common belief in future rationality if we would not impose …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049812

Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 174-189

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117135

Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 24-44

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable – cheap...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738052