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Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

Casella, Alessandra; Turban, Sébastien - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 47-70

We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives. Voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. We identify a sufficient condition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117141

Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects

Ekici, Özgün - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 1-10

We study desirability axioms imposed on allocations in indivisible object allocation problems. The existing axioms in the literature are various conditions of robustness to blocking coalitions with respect to agentsʼ ex ante (individual rationality and group rationality) and ex post (Pareto...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049674

Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms

Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 360-374

We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or best-responses. First, we show that a necessary condition for recurrent implementation in better-response dynamics (BRD) is a small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577250

To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria

Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 138-152

We study the implementation problem when players are prone to make mistakes. To capture the idea of mistakes, Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium (LQRE) is used, and we consider a case in which players are almost rational, i.e., the sophistication level of players approaches infinity. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603331

Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors

Dittmann, Ingolf; Kübler, Dorothea; Maug, Ernst; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 17-38

interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have … the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can … model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049763

Political competition between differentiated candidates

Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias K. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 249-271

We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049805

Smooth multibidding mechanisms

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Quérou, Nicolas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 420-438

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is “smoother” in the sense that small variations in an agentʼs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049749

Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter

Diermeier, Daniel; Fong, Pohan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 349-353

We generalize the dynamic bargaining game of Diermeier and Fong (2011) to arbitrary quota rules to provide a non-cooperative characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set. Assuming that players are sufficiently patient and have strict preferences, a pure-strategy stationary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664596

On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco; Reuben, Ernesto; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 40-57

We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785206

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

Cheikbossian, Guillaume - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 68-82

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049667

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