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The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups

Ryvkin, Dmitry - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 564-572

We study how aggregate effort exerted in contests between groups of heterogeneous players depends on the sorting of … players into groups. We show that the optimal sorting depends on the curvature of the effort cost function. From the … steep effort cost function, the optimal sorting of players may be the one that maximizes the variation in ability across …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573651

Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?

Triossi, Matteo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 169-191

This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049772

Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences

Hernández, Penélope; Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 56-66

of neighbors of the network. For high degrees of heterogeneity in the population the equilibria is such that every player …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049725

Minimax play by teams

Okano, Yoshitaka - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 168-180

We analyze the behavior of two-person teams and individuals who repeatedly play the game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in the laboratory. When teams play OʼNeillʼs 4×4 game against another team, the choice frequencies are consistent with equilibrium of the game at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049773

Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

Casella, Alessandra; Turban, Sébastien - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 47-70

We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives. Voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. We identify a sufficient condition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117141

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

Cheikbossian, Guillaume - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 68-82

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049667

Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: A revenue dominance theorem

Franke, Jörg; Kanzow, Christian; Leininger, Wolfgang; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 116-126

heterogeneity among contestants. The incentive effect due to a strongly discriminating contest rule (all-pay auction) dominates the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049677

The fragility of information aggregation in large elections

Mandler, Michael - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 257-268

In a common-values election where voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior, suppose there is a small amount of uncertainty about the conditional likelihood of the signalʼs outcome, given the correct candidate. Once this uncertainty is resolved, the signal is i.i.d. across...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049798

Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

Drouvelis, Michalis; Saporiti, Alejandro; Vriend, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 86-115

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049886

Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 224-238

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931195