allocated efficiently at the auction stage whether resale markets are present or not. The simultaneous second-price, on the … resale in second-price auctions decreases the efficiency rate at the auction stage compared to the no resale case. However …, after resale, the efficiency rate in second-price is as high as that of Vickrey auction without resale outcomes in the …

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed-bid auctions with symmetric independent private values and 400 …

We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and without package bidding. In the … levels of synergies. We conduct experiments varying auction rules and the degree of synergies. Observed efficiencies are …

men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price … auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the …We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with …

“regular” bidders. In an English auction when all bidders are active, “regular” bidders free ride, exiting before price reaches … their values. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, limiting free … riding compared to the English auction. We find substantial, though incomplete, free riding in the clock auction. In first-price …

/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from … traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market-clearing price. It fails to achieve all possible gains from trade … simple yet mildly inefficient buyer's bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism. …

between a buyer and a seller and the first-price auction between two buyers (or two sellers). Combining results from those two …We study a sealed-bid auction between two bidders with asymmetric independent private values. The two bidders own … asymmetric shares in a partnership. The higher bidder buys the lower bidderʼs shares at a per-unit price that is a convex …