Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of their residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive...

The classical bankruptcy problem is extended by assuming that there are multiple estates. In the finite estate case, the agents have homogeneous preferences per estate, which may differ across estates. In the more general infinite estate problem, players have arbitrary preferences over an...

We explore in this paper the axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes. We formalize two models for this problem on the grounds of two different informational bases. In both models, we provide axiomatic rationale for natural rules to solve the problem. We,...

Users need to connect a pair of target nodes in the network. They share the fixed connection costs of the edge. The system manager elicits target pairs from users, builds the cheapest forest meeting all demands, and choose a cost sharing rule satisfying:

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any...

We consider the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, and characterize the family of rules satisfying four standard invariance requirements, homogeneity, two composition properties, and consistency. It takes as point of departure the characterization of the family of two-claimant rules...

Resource egalitarianism and welfare egalitarianism are two focal conceptions of distributive justice. We show in this paper that they share a solid common ground. To do so, we analyze a simple model of resource allocation in which agentsʼ abilities (to transform the resource into an...

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a bundle of infinitely divisible goods among a group of agents with “classical” preferences. We propose to measure an agentʼs “sacrifice” at an allocation by the size of the set of feasible bundles that the agent prefers to her consumption....

We consider the problem of assigning agents to slots on a line, where only one agent can be served at a slot and each agent prefers to be served as close as possible to his target. Our focus is on aggregate gap minimizing methods, i.e., those that minimize the total gap between targets and...

Numerous gift-exchange experiments have found a positive wage–effort relationship. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. This paper explores to what extent the separation of ownership and control affects the wage–effort relationship. We compare the...