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A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games

Chen, Yi-Chun - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 587-597

We prove that the structure theorem for rationalizability originally from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) applies to any … the normal-form concept of interim correlated rationalizability and we assume that players have no relevant knowledge of … rationalizability. We also strengthen the main selection result of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) by showing that the result holds for any …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049820

On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k

Breitmoser, Yves; Tan, Jonathan H.W.; Zizzo, Daniel John - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 102-125

The extensive form game we study has multiple perfect equilibria, but it has a unique limiting logit equilibrium (QRE) and a unique level-k prediction as k approaches infinity. The convergence paths of QRE and level-k are different, but they converge to the same limit point. We analyze whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785195

Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 339-353

This paper proposes axiomatic foundations of expectation formation rules, by which deviating players anticipate the reaction of external players in a partition function game. The projection rule is the only rule satisfying subset consistency and responsiveness to the original partition of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117136

Fair by design: Multidimensional envy-free mechanisms

Mu'alem, Ahuva - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 29-46

We address the common scenario where a group of agents wants to divide a set of items fairly, and at the same time seeks to optimize a global goal. Suppose that each item is a task and we want to find an allocation that minimizes the completion time of the last task in an envy-free manner, where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117143

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Weerdt, Mathijs M. de; Harrenstein, Paul; Conitzer, Vincent - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 405-420

A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785192

Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies

Tsakas, Elias - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 126-144

In this paper, we introduce a notion of epistemic equivalence between hierarchies of conditional beliefs and hierarchies of lexicographic beliefs, thus extending the standard equivalence results of Halpern (2010) and Brandenburger et al. (2007) to an interactive setting, and we show that there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785196

Imperfect memory and choice under risk

Gottlieb, Daniel - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 127-158

This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906700

Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 921-935

This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games—the absence of empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in opponentsʼ behavior and to comply with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049668

On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations

Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 714-730

The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two sellers is examined. It is shown that the buyer (weakly) prefers private negotiations so as to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. With substitute goods, such uncertainty is valuable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049671

Conservative belief and rationality

Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael - In: Games and Economic Behavior 80 (2013) C, pp. 186-192

correlated equilibrium where all playersʼ beliefs have common support. We also define a notion of strong rationalizability, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049678