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Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary

Liang, Pinghan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 15-30

This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal–intermediary–agent hierarchy. In … this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We … characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049733

Communication in bargaining over decision rights

Lim, Wooyoung - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 159-179

This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. We introduce two different bargaining mechanisms: tacit and explicit bargaining. In tacit bargaining, an uninformed principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906690

Authority and communication in the laboratory

Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 541-560

We report findings from experiments on two delegation–communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to … via cheap talk to obtain decision-relevant information. In the game in which the delegation outcome is payoff-dominated by … authority and agent-subjects communicate truthfully. Significantly more choices of delegation than of communication are observed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049784

Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers

Non, Arjan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 319-336

By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal–agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049876

Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard

Auster, Sarah - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 503-521

This paper introduces asymmetric awareness into the classical principal–agent model and discusses the optimal contract between a fully aware principal and an unaware agent. The principal enlarges the agentʼs awareness strategically when proposing a contract and faces a tradeoff between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049755

Endogenous information and stochastic contracts

Terstiege, Stefan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 535-547

A growing literature analyzes revenue-maximizing contracts for situations in which agents can acquire private information before they decide whether to join the contract. It is conjectured that the results also apply to the more natural scenario where information can be acquired either before or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588265

Incorporating unawareness into contract theory

Filiz-Ozbay, Emel - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 181-194

Asymmetric awareness of the contracting parties regarding the uncertainty surrounding them is proposed as a reason for incompleteness in contractual forms. An insurance problem is studied between a risk neutral insurer, who has superior awareness regarding the nature of the uncertainty, and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664599

Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Sloof, Randolph; Siemens, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 289-305

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906694

First-best collusion without communication

Rachmilevitch, Shiran - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 224-230

I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderʼs valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049799

Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information

Aoyagi, Masaki - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 77-89

the number of adoptions. We study ex post implementable sales schemes that are collusion-proof, and show that under the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049855

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