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Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce; Williams, Steven R. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 247-270

An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of … general PSCs with nontrivial profit sharing than in an auction with only a one-time payment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049754

Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions

Zheng, Charles Z. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 648-664

A model of English auctions is proposed to incorporate the possibility of jump bidding. When two objects are sold separately via such auctions, bidders signal their willingness to pay via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the prices without relying on any central mediator....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588270

The Dynamic Vickrey Auction

Mierendorff, Konrad - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 192-204

payment rule coincides with the payment rule of the Vickrey Auction. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719485

'On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints', Third Version

Kotowski, Maciej H. - 2014

. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N … and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060798

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 130-134

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117138

Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis

Chen, Ning; Ghosh, Arpita; Lambert, Nicolas S. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 367-391

loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise … of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how does the Prosper auction do in terms of the borrower's payment, when … lenders are strategic agents with private true interest rates? We first analyze the Prosper auction as a game of complete …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785191

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Weerdt, Mathijs M. de; Harrenstein, Paul; Conitzer, Vincent - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 405-420

A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms …, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785192

Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions

Satterthwaite, Mark A.; Williams, Steven R.; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 248-263

/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from … simple yet mildly inefficient buyer's bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785202

Destroy to save

de Clippel, Geoffroy; Naroditskiy, Victor; Polukarov, Maria - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 392-404

We study the problem of allocating m identical items among nm agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant-strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785205

Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch

Kirkegaard, René - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 60-69

I consider first-price auctions (FPA) and second-price auctions (SPA) with two asymmetric bidders. The FPA is known to be more profitable than the SPA if the strong bidder's distribution function is convex and the weak bidder's distribution is obtained by truncating or horizontally shifting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906696