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Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable

Rehbeck, John - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 207-210

We extend the result from Bossert and Sprumont (2013) that every single-valued choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable via strict preferences to the case of choice correspondences via weak preferences.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117137

Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

Casella, Alessandra; Turban, Sébastien - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 47-70

We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives. Voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. We identify a sufficient condition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117141

Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma

Maruta, Toshimasa; Okada, Akira - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 269-284

We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049791

Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem

Hu, Cheng-Cheng; Tsay, Min-Hung; Yeh, Chun-Hsien - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 185-197

We consider the “airport problem”, which is concerned with sharing the cost of an airstrip among agents who need airstrips of different lengths. We investigate the implications of two properties, Left-endpoint Subtraction (LS) bilateral consistency and LS converse consistency, in the airport...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049883

Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms

Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 360-374

We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or best-responses. First, we show that a necessary condition for recurrent implementation in better-response dynamics (BRD) is a small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577250

Buyer groups as strategic commitments

Dana, James D. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 470-485

Buyer cooperatives, buyer alliances, and horizontal mergers are often perceived as attempts to increase buyer power. In contrast to prior research emphasizing group size, I show that even small buyer groups composed of buyers with heterogeneous preferences can increase price competition among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573663

To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria

Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 138-152

We study the implementation problem when players are prone to make mistakes. To capture the idea of mistakes, Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium (LQRE) is used, and we consider a case in which players are almost rational, i.e., the sophistication level of players approaches infinity. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603331

Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

Bach, Christian W.; Tsakas, Elias - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 48-59

by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906693

Admissibility and event-rationality

Barelli, Paulo; Galanis, Spyros - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 21-40

type spaces to capture interactive beliefs, we show that event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER … standard belief to validated belief, we show that event-rationality and common validated belief of event-rationality (RCvBER …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049856

Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information

Samet, Dov - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 192-200

Aumann (1995) showed that for games with perfect information common knowledge of substantive rationality implies … backward induction. Substantive rationality is defined in epistemic terms, that is, in terms of knowledge. We show that when … substantive rationality is defined in doxastic terms, that is, in terms of belief, then common belief of substantive rationality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662459