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Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget. We...
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We study a majoritarian bargaining model in which players make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players that move first forms with payoffs proportional to the voting weights. This...
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The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a correct common prior in a two-person signaling game. Equilibrium selection arguments predict that different equilibria may be...
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