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How proper is sequential equilibrium?
Mailath, George J. - In: Games and economic behavior 18 (1997) 2, pp. 193-218
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001217288
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Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
Mailath, George J. - In: Games and economic behavior 3 (1991) 4, pp. 467-486
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001116689
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The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
Mailath, George J.; Obara, Ichiro - In: Games and economic behavior 40 (2002) 1, pp. 99-122
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001690773
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Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Olszewski, Wojciech - In: Games and economic behavior 71 (2011) 1, pp. 174-192
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009241899
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Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - In: Games and economic behavior 53 (2005) 1, pp. 126-140
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003175976
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Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria
Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - In: Games and economic behavior 53 (2005) 1, pp. 126-140
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008214022
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The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
Mailath, George J.; Obara, Ichiro; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - In: Games and economic behavior 40 (2002) 1, pp. 99-122
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008216307
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How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?
Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Games and economic behavior 18 (1997) 2, pp. 193-218
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008220144
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Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Olszewski, Wojciech - In: Games and economic behavior 71 (2011) 1, pp. 174-193
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008781766