This paper provides information on negotiation patterns in the EU and analyzes the influence of qualified majority voting on the formation of coalitions and the distribution of voting power among the EU states as represented in the Council. Important factors for this analysis are the weighting...

We discuss two inter-related puzzling features of the literature on a priori voting power. First, the mathematical model used in virtually all this literature does not recognize abstention as an option distinct from both a 'yes' and a 'no' vote. Second, reallife decision rules of voting bodies -...

These are critical remarks on Holler and Widgrén (1999) and in particular on Holler's Public Good Index. The central idea is a distinction between two underlying pre-formal notions of a priori voting power: power as influence over the outcome, and power as expected relative share in a payoff.

We explain the issue of the decision rule of the EU’s Council of Ministers. We outline, in as non-technical fashion as we can, the mathematical theory (due to L S Penrose) that addresses this sort of issue. We assess the decision rule prescribed in the Nice Treaty as well as that included in...