Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

We evaluate the quantity-quality trade-off on the labor market by estimating an augmented matching function weighting the matches by quality measures. We use the approach to evaluate the German labor market reforms conducted between 2003 and 2005. Indeed, we find a significant quantity-quality...

Im Jahr 2000 wurden mit der Einführung von Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II) die Sanktionsmöglichkeiten gegenüber ALG II-Empfängern verschärft. Der Beitrag untersucht die Auswirkung einer solchen ALG II-Sanktion auf den Reservationslohn sanktionierter ALG II-Empfänger. Empirisch sind die...