using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core … of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games. Our result can also be seen as a downside of coherent …

using coherent measures of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core … of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games. Our result can also be seen as a downside of coherent …

axiomatization of the Shapley value that the requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity are …

axiomatization of the Shapley value that the requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity are …

We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph … solution. Previously this result was only known for multiple partners assignment games, which correspond to the case where G is … stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and perform a study on the core of the …

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

. The second part of the paper proposes new techniques to analyse the behaviour of matching markets. We introduce the Stable …