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Traffic Routing Oligopoly
Csercsik, Dávid; Sziklai, Balázs - 2013
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a novel family of games related to congested networks. Traffic routing has … in the network, externalities may arise, thus the underlying games are given in partition function form. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494546
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Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks
Csercsik, Dávid; Kóczy, László Á. - 2011
and consumption. We study the game of balancing group formation and show that the game contains widespread externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494487
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Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks
Csercsik, David; Koczy, Laszlo A. - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2011
and consumption. We study the game of balancing group formation and show that the game contains widespread externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195311
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The risk-based core for cooperative games with uncertainty
Kóczy, László Á. - 2019
In coalitional games with uncertain payoffs, a deviating coalition can only form expectations regarding its post-deviation payoff. Classical approaches address the problem from the side of conservatism, expecting the worst, or by explicit assumptions of the emerging state of the world. We borrow...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290287
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Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks
Csercsik, Dávid; Hubert, Franz; Sziklai, Balázs R.; … - 2019
"externalities", the description of which requires partition function form (PFF) games. In this paper we propose a method to compute …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290285
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Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty
Habis, Helga; Csercsik, Dávid - 2012
We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. we allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494526
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Competition and cooperation in a PFF game theoretic model of electrical energy trade
Csercsik, Dávid - 2013
A cooperative game theoretic framework is introduced to study the behavior of cooperating and competing electrical energy providers considering price-preference rational consumers. We analyze the interactions of generators in an idealized environment described by a DC load flow model where the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494543
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Cooperation in traffic routing games on scale free wireless networks
Csercsik, Dávid - 2014
operation of the network. As in the proposed model cooperation strongly affects routing dynamics of the network, externalities …Local routing protocols in scale free networks have been extensively studied. In this paper we consider a wireless … contextualization of this routing problem and analyze on the one hand how cooperation affects network efficiency, and on the other hand …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494589
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Cooperation in traffic routing games on scale free wireless networks
Csercsik, Dávid - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2014
operation of the network. As in the proposed model cooperation strongly affects routing dynamics of the network, externalities …Local routing protocols in scale free networks have been extensively studied. In this paper we consider a wireless … contextualization of this routing problem and analyze on the one hand how cooperation affects network efficiency, and on the other hand …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010941759
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Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty
Habis, Helga; Csercsik, David - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2012
We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. we allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693800