An agreement about a lower bound for admissible tax rates can reduce the equilibrium tax rate (and thus welfare) in tax competition among fully symmetric countries. This is shown in an infinitely repeated game where the stage game describes the standard tax competition model with source-based...

The paper analyzes a political accountability game with an electorate of 'partisan' and 'independent' voters. It is shown that politicians have a strategic incentive to engage in 'divisive politics', that is, to force some independent voters to take sides, even if the direct electoral benefits...

This paper reviews recent developments in the theory of optimal income taxation and draws two broad conclusions with respect to the Hungarian personal income tax system. The first conclusion is that the optimal top marginal tax rate is likely to be higher, perhaps substantially, than the actual...

This paper develops a flexible price, two-sector nominal growth model, in order to study the nominal aspects of capital accumulation (convergence). We adopt a classical model of a small open economy with traded and nontraded goods, and enrich its structure with gradual investment and a...

We study the adjustment process of a small open economy to a sudden worsening of external conditions. To model the sudden stop, we use a highly non-linear specification that captures credit constraints in a convenient way. The advantage of our approach is that the effects of the shock become...

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