We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and...

This paper develops a matching model of the labor market under wage rigidity when hiring decisions are irreversible. There are two types of workers, the skilled and the unskilled. The model is used to analyze whether technological advances may have increased unemployment. It is shown that it is...

The distributional effects of the minimum wage are analyzed in a model where skilled and unskilled labor enter the production function. It is argued that distributional goals are best achieved by letting the labor market clear and achieving redistribution through taxes and transfers

We develop a model to analyze the implications of firing costs on incentives for R amp; D and international specialization. The key idea is that, to avoid paying firing costs, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product...