We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the...

Fiscal performance in Latin America looks much improved this decade compared to the 1980s or 1990s. Is this a "structural" improvement or likely to be transitory? This paper answers this question by estimating the relationship between non-commodity revenue and the economic cycle, and evaluating...

Fiscal performance in Latin America looks much improved this decade compared to the 1980s or 1990s. Is this a ""structural"" improvement or likely to be transitory? This paper answers this question by estimating the relationship between non-commodity revenue and the economic cycle, and...

We identify structural breaks in economic growth in 140 countries and use these to define ""growth spells:"" periods of high growth preceded by an upbreak and ending either with a downbreak or with the end of the sample. Growth spells tend to be shorter in African and Latin American countries...

This paper surveys the literature on sovereign debt from the perspective of understanding how sovereign debt differs from privately issue debt, and why sovereign debt is deemed safe in some countries but risky in others. The answers relate to the unique power of the sovereign. One the one hand,...

This paper uses a dynamic optimization model to estimate the welfare gains of hedging against commodity price risk for commodity-exporting countries. The introduction of hedging instruments such as futures and options enhances domestic welfare through two channels. First, by reducing export...

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. SUDDEN STOPS AND RESERVES: SOME FACTS -- III. THE MODEL -- IV. APPLICATIONS -- V. EXTENSIONS -- VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS -- APPENDIX: COMPUTATIONS -- REFERENCES.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATABASE -- III. DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL DEBT -- IV. THE STRUCTURE OF DOMESTIC DEBT -- V. MONETARY INSTABILITY AND DOMESTIC ORIGINAL SIN -- VI. CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES.

Using a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are...