Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE -- III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE -- IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER -- V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS -- REFERENCES.

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. A MODEL OF GLOBALIZATION HAZARD AND PRICE GUARANTEES -- III. CHARACTERIZING THE GLOBALIZATION HAZARD-MORAL HAZARD TRADEOFF -- IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS -- V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES.

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