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Corruption, Competition, and Contracts; A Model of Vote Buying

Vardy, Felix J. J.; Morgan, John - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2006

In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248248

Ponzi Schemes in the Caribbean

Carvajal, Ana; Monroe, Hunter K.; Pattillo, Catherine A.; … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2009

In several Caribbean states, unregulated investment schemes grew quickly in recent years by claiming unusually high monthly returns and through a system of referrals by existing members. These are features shared with traditional Ponzi schemes and pyramid schemes. This paper describes the growth...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999962

Hold Your Nose and Vote; Why Do Some Democracies tolerate Corruption?

Pani, Marco - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2009

This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999974

Modeling Politics with Economics tools; A Critical Survey of the Literature

Olters, Jan-Peter - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2001

Whereas the economics discipline possesses a highly refined theoretical apparatus to analyze the effects of government behaviour on the economy, it has not (yet) managed to fully develop a positively formulated "economic theory of politics" that would permit the integration of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005605269

Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns

Lockwood, Ben; Borgne, Eric Le - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2003

This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between an incumbent officeholder and the electorate, where the officeholder is initially uninformed about her ability. If officeholder effort and ability interact in the "production function" that determines performance in office,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005605403

The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions; Theory and Empirical Evidence

Debrun, Xavier; Kumar, Manmohan S. - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2007

This paper discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline. A dynamic model of fiscal policy shows that optimal institutions lack credibility unless the costs to bypass them are sufficiently high. In our model, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005825631

Corporate Governance Reforms in the EU; Do they Matter and How?

Ivaschenko, Iryna V.; Brooks, Petya Koeva - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2008

dynamics of the voting premiums, a measure of the private benefits of control in a corporation. The results indicate that the … reforms have been successful in reducing the voting premiums EU-wide. Moreover, more intense and broad reform efforts (such as … voting premiums across countries and over time. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005825659

Rethinking the Governance of the International Monetary Fund

Mirakhor, Abbas; Zaidi, Iqbal Mehdi - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2006

, in the context of voice and voting shares, before international institutions, such as the IMF, are to be justifiable to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005825790

Institutional Inertia

Valderrama, Laura - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2009

institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on … technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic … leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce each other …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528612

Ethnic Diversity, Democracy, and Corruption

Yehoue, Etienne B. - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2007

I study the link between ethnic diversity, democracy, and corruption. In a static model, I show that contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption might emerge as a negative externality of democracy. This occurs through ethnicity, which appears as a rent-extracting technology in a democratic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248127