We track direct public interventions and public holdings in 1,114 financial institutions over the period 2007-17 in 37 countries based on publicly available information. We use aggregate official data to validate this new dataset and estimate the fiscal impact of interventions, including the...

We present a novel approach that incorporates individual entity stress testing and losses from systemic risk effects (SE losses) into macroprudential stress testing. SE losses are measured using a reduced-form model to value financial entity assets, conditional on macroeconomic stress and the...

We present a semi-structural model of default risk, which is a function of loan and borrower characteristics, economic conditions, and the regulatory environment. We use this model to simulate bank credit losses for stress-testing purposes and to calibrate borrower-based macroprudential tools....

Whether and to what extent tougher bank regulation weighs on economic growth is an open empirical question. Using data from 28 manufacturing industries in 50 countries, we explore the extent to which cross-country differences in bank liquidity and capital levels were related to differences in...

The COVID-19 pandemic could result in large government interventions in the banking industry. To shed light on the possible consequences on market power, we rely on the experience of the global financial crisis and exploit granular data on government interventions in more than 800 banks across...

Globally, financial institutions have increased their holdings of domestic sovereign debt, tightening the linkage between the health of the financial system and the level of sovereign debt, or the "financial sector-sovereign nexus," during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In South Africa, the...

This paper presents a model of a banking industry with heterogeneous banks that delivers predictions on the relationship between banks'' risk of failure, market structure, bank ownership, and banks'' screening and bankruptcy costs. These predictions are explored empirically using a panel of...

We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and...

The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk asserts. We show that this undermines the traditional result that high capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an...

Government support to banks through the provision of explicit or implicit guarantees affects the willingness of banks to take on risk by reducing market discipline or by increasing charter value. We use an international sample of bank data and government support to banks for the periods...