We prove the existence of a greatest and a least interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium for supermodular games of incomplete information. There are two main differences from the earlier proofs in Vives (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990): we use the interim formulation of a Bayesian game, in which...

This is a chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Clemens Puppe, eds., Oxford University Press, 2008. We review classic normative expected utility theory. Our goal is to frame the subsequent chapters (which consider more modern...

The strong negative link between democracy and output volatility documented by Rodrik (2000) and others stands in sharp contrast to the lack of consensus on the democracy-growth relationship. To explain stable growth performance in democracies we characterize political systems in terms of the...

In this paper, we present two alternative models of trade and unemployment, in which unemployment is generated through a search mechanism. The basic framework of the first model is Ricardian in that the only factor of production is labor and trade is based on relative technological differences....