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College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

Pais, Joana; Pintér, Agnes; Veszteg, Róbert F. - 2008

experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our … truthful preference revelation. In addition, we find that information has an important effect on truthful behavior and … stability. Nevertheless, regarding efficiency, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is less sensitive to the amount of information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332350

College Admissions and the Role of Information : An Experimental Study

Pintér, Ágnes; Veszteg, Robert Ferec; Pais, Joana - 2008

experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our … of truthful preference revelation. In addition, we find that information has an important effect on truthful behavior and … stability. Nevertheless, regarding efficiency, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is less sensitive to the amount of information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220116

The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private

Aoyagi, Masaki - 2015

repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018397

Intelligence promotes cooperation in long-term interaction: Experimental evidence in infinitely repeated public goods games

Kawamura, Tetsuya; Tsz Kwan Tse, Tiffany - 2021

A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793786

Market concentration and incentives to collude in Cournot oligopoly experiments

Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Masiliūnas, Aidas - 2021

Multiple Cournot oligopoly experiments found more collusive behavior in markets with fewer firms (Huck et al., 2004; Horstmann et al., 2018). This result could be explained by a higher difficulty to coordinate or by lower incentives to collude in markets with more firms. We show that the Quantal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012544022

Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game

Drouvelis, Michalis; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Shimodaira, Yuta - 2024

Extending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i) in addition to taking, the proposers can give part of their endowment to the responders, and ii) in addition to destroying their own endowment in retaliation, the responders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015130188

An Apology for Lying

Aoki, Keiko - 2013

We investigate what types of social factors affect apology behavior for a previous lie and credibility levels for that apology. We abruptly provide subjects an opportunity to send an apology message after completion of the deception game (Gneezy, 2005) and investigate the effects of three main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094313

Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - 2007

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332239

Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money

Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - 2007

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjostrom, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223471

Mutual knowledge of rationality in the electronic mail game

Takamiya, Koji; Tanaka, Akira - 2006

This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332403