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The Market for liars: Reputation and auditor honesty

McLennan, Andrew; Park, In-Uck - 2003

In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a 'two-tier equilibrium' in which 'reputable' auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332213

Endogenous Information Acquisition and the Partial Announcement Policy

Arato, Hiroki; Hori, Takeo; Nakamura, Tomoya - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 2014

We consider implementability and the welfare effects of a partial announcement policy using a model of a beauty contest where agentsf actions are strategic complements and where their decisions on public information acquisition are endogenous. The following results are obtained: i) if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010766385

Recent competition in the Japanese life insurance industry

Souma, Toshiyuki; Tsutsui, Yoshiro - 2005

This paper examines a change in the level of competition in the Japanese life insurance industry over the last 17 years …. We estimate the first order condition for profit-maximizing insurance oligopolies to obtain the degree of non … Insurance Industry Law and failures of insurance companies promoted the competition; and 4) the competition in the recent years …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332256

Selling order in a sequential auction

Gunay, Hikmet; Meng, Xin; Perez, Victor - 2024

In a second-price sequential auction with both global and local bidders, we explore the optimal order for selling heterogeneous goods to maximize efficiency or revenue. Our findings indicate that selling the good with very small variance (almost-zero variance) first yields higher revenue, while...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015209768

Signaling vision: Knowing when to quit

Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2024

We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. This creates opportunities for low types who do not observe any news to mimic high types by quitting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015209998

A characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices for an arbitrary number of agents and objects

Wakabayashi, Yuya; Sakai, Ryosuke; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2022

We consider the economy consisting of n agents and m heterogenous objects where the seller benefits v from objects. Our study focuses on the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). In the situation with arbitrary n, m and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013349604

No price envy in the multi-unit object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences

Shinozaki, Hiroki - 2022

We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among a set of agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units of the object, and has a (possibly) non-quasi-linear preference on the set of (consumption) bundles. We assume that preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013349607

Signaling under double-crossing preferences: The case of discrete types

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2022

The class of double-crossing preferences, where signaling is cheaper for higher types than for lower types at low signaling levels and the opposite is true at high signaling levels, underlines the phenomenon of countersignaling. We show that under the D1 refinement, the equilibrium signaling...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013349609

Many-to-many matching on a skill-sharing platform

Aoyagi, Masaki - 2022

Each agent in a market needs to supplement his skill with a particular skill of another agent to complete his project. A platform matches the agents and allows members of the same match to share their skills. A match is valuable to an agent if he is matched with any agent who possesses a skill...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472341

Characterizing pairwise strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with money

Shinozaki, Hiroki - 2022

We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472342