Showing 1 - 10 of 51
We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are N types of bidders whose valuations are … decrease. Finally, we give sufficient conditions that ensure the seller will not use a reserve price; hence, the auction will …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332453
We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City … the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring allocates a win …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217151
In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of each firm is additively separable in quality and type. In sharp contrast to the recent results in the literature we show the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052249
This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement … exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering a monetary loss induced by winning the auction, and also mitigates the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158242
procedure. Producers who join this new auction institution have the incentive to raise their bids and pull up the EMP in order … new auction institution (i) are close to the production cost and coincide with those of the standard FPA under the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207223
This paper reports the theoretical and experimental results of auctions for public construction in which firms cut corners. We show that the winning bids and the winner's quality choices of the constructed buildings are both zero in equilibria if there are at least two firms whose initial cash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014207647
In a second-price sequential auction with both global and local bidders, we explore the optimal order for selling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015209768
We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among a set of agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units of the object, and has a (possibly) non-quasi-linear preference on the set of (consumption) bundles. We assume that preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013349607
We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472342
This study explores two key factors influencing subjects' deviation from domi- nant bidding in Vickrey auction … analyze the effect of understanding SP, we quiz subjects before an experimental Vickrey auction and examine whether their … Vickrey auction experiments is not human interaction but a lack of understanding of SP. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540475