In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its membersfind it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherentasymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informalsanctioning harder to accomplish...

We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom-Blume-Varian model of non-cooperative voluntary contributions to a public goodthat avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is in-creased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the...

We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a uniqueLindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public goodmodel. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public goodmodel, lends itself to a...

We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision toallow for two or more public goods, and explore the new possibilitiesthat arise in this setting. We show that, when there are many publicgoods, voluntary contrib...

We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good modelto provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. Incontrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the pro-liferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, andcan readily analyse games...

The literature shows that for most UK industries privatization might be necessary but is not sufficient to produce economic benefits. Often prior changes in management or later changes in market structure and regulation have larger impacts than privatization itself. We ask what changes around...

In der WTO-Agrarhandelsrunde von Doha geht es neben dem Abbau von Exportsubventionen und der Abschaffung von Marktzugangsbeschränkungen auch um die weitere Reduktion von internen Subventionen, die als produktions- und damit handelsverzerrend eingestuft sind. Eine Gruppe von Ländern, darunter...

When a deficit occurs in the funding of collective goods, it is usually covered by raising theamount of taxes or by rationing the supply of the goods. This article compares the efficiencyof these institutions. We report the results of a 2x2 experiment based on a game in the firststage of which...

Political corruption is a concern of many modern democracies. It weakens democraticinstitutions, restricts public services, and lowers productivity undermining economicdevelopment. Yet despite its importance, our understanding of what determines corruption islimited. This paper uses a novel...

We offer a novel explanation for the use of collateral based on the dual function of banks to provide credit and assess the borrowers credit risk. There is no moral hazard or adverse selection on the part of borrowers the only inefficiency is that banks cannot contractually commit to providing...