In this paper, we present two real-world situations in which the standard hypotheses of a bargaining problem do not hold, and discuss how to tackle these situations.

We consider a von Neumann–Morgenstern market game and present a simple expression for the Shapley value via decomposition as the difference of an airport game and an extended airport game. The resulting formula has a useful interpretation for designing an allocation procedure among the agents.

The issue of veto may play an important role in an approval situation, mainly in political science, where several scholars dealt with this topic. In this survey we want to update the state-of-the-art, paying particular attention to the open problems that various authors pointed out in their...

Location problems describe those situations in which one or more facilities have to be placed in a region trying to optimize a suitable objective function. Game theory has been used as a tool to solve location problems and this paper is devoted to describe the state-of-the-art of the research on...

We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers are known by all of them. Then two types of...

Recently it is proved that all infinite assignment games have a non-empty core. Using this fact, and a technique suggested by L. S. Shapley for finite permutation games, we prove similar results for infinite permutation games. Infinite transportation games can be interpreted as a generalization...