A common feature of many speculative attack models on currencies is the existence of multiple equilibrium solutions. When choosing the equilibrium strategy, a trader faces Knightian uncertainty about the rational choice of the other traders. We show that the concept of Choquet expected utility...

In the paper two-person nonzero-sum semi-infinite games with bounded payoffs are studied — both with countable and uncountable infinite strategy space. Under some concavity/convexity assumptions they are shown to possess ε-equilibria (equilibria) in strategies with supports consisting of at...

This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative...

Considered here is direct exchange of production allowances or input factors. Motivated by practical modeling and compution, we suppose every owner or user of such items has a linear technology. The issue is whether competitive market equilibrium can be reached merely via iterated bilateral...

The fertile application of cooperative game techniques to cost sharing problems on networks has so far concentrated on the Stand Alone core test of fairness and/or stability, and ignored many combinatorial optimization problems where this core can be empty. I submit there is much room for an...

In this paper, a design of strategies for players in pursuit-evasion games, is provided. The design incorporates players' preferences captured in their goal functions which are constructed using particular functional forms that include multiattribute copulas. The approach provides closed-form...

In this paper we study and compute E-points in an explicit way for a special kind of diagonal games with 3k + 1, 4k + 3 and sk + 1 players where 1 ≤ s ≤ k.

This is a brief survey describing some of the recent progress and open problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of cooperation in noncooperative Bayesian games.