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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136986

Social Relations and Relational Incentives

Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255564

Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256032

Paid to quit

Dur, Robert; Schmittdiel, Heiner - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256343

The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Verbeke, Willem - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

find that a more convex prize spread increases performance in the second round at the expense of first-round performance … historically have relatively stable performance as compared to stores with more noisy performance. Publication is forthcoming in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256723

Dynamic Incentive Effects of Relative Performance Pay: A Field Experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Verbeke, Willem - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores … from the control group over the course of four weeks. Treatment stores received weekly feedback on relative performance …. Control stores were kept unaware of their involvement, so that their performance generates exogenous variation in the relative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257305

Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri; Verbeke, Willem - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

This discussion paper has led to a publication in the Journal of Labor Economics, 2013, 32(2), 305-326. We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257323

Tournament Incentives in The Field: Gender Differences in The Workplace

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri; Verbeke, Willem - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987442

Public Sector Employees: Risk Averse and Altruistic?

Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert; Bossche, Seth Van den - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

We assess whether public sector employees have a stronger inclination to serve others and are more risk averse than employees in the private sector. A unique feature of our study is that we use revealed rather than stated preferences data. Respondents of a large-scale survey were offered a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964457

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137227