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Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection : The Theory and its Application to Ontario

Kantarevic, Jasmin - 2015

We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016351

Second-Degree Moral Hazard in a Real-World Credence Goods Market

Balafoutas, Loukas - 2014

Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061956

The Response to Dynamic Incentives in Insurance Contracts with a Deductible : Evidence from a Differences-in-Regression-Discontinuities Design

Klein, Tobias J. - 2020

We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a … large Dutch health insurer we find that individuals are forward-looking. Changing dynamic incentives by increasing the … annual level. The response to dynamic incentives is an important part of the overall effect of cost-sharing schemes on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837905

Bonus Culture : Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland - 2013

talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on performance pay and other high-powered incentives, thereby shifting effort … perfect competition, the resulting efficiency loss can be much larger than that imposed by a single firm or principal, who … distorts incentives downward in order to extract rents. More generally, as declining market frictions lead employers to compete …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083378

The Role of Sickness in the Evaluation of Job Search Assistance and Sanctions

van den Berg, Gerard J. - 2016

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001341

The Dilemma of Delegating Search : Budgeting in Public Employment Services

Addison, John T. - 2010

high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138264

Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141421

Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy

Bertola, Giuseppe - 2013

We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071425

You Don't Always Get What You Pay For

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775692

Dynamic Incentive Effects of Relative Performance Pay : A Field Experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse - 2013

performance of the treatment stores. As predicted by theory, we find that treatment stores that lag far behind do not respond to … the incentives, while the responsiveness of treatment stores close to winning a bonus increases in relative performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074203