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Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices : Evidence from German Soccer

Feess, Eberhard; Gerfin, Michael; Mühlheußer, Gerd - 2021

Recent theoretical research has identified many ways how contracts can be used as rent seeking devices vis-à-vis third parties, but there is no empirical evidence on this issue so far. To test some basic qualitative properties of this literature, we develop a theoretical and empirical framework...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324781

Exposing Corruption : Can Electoral Competition Discipline Politicians?

Afridi, Farzana - 2016

accountability and reduce corruption. In this paper we show that electoral discipline may be ineffective in reducing corruption when … competition on corruption. We show that in equilibrium, corruption has a U-shaped relationship with electoral competition. If the … election is safe for the incumbent (low competition) or if it is extremely fragile (high competition) then corruption is higher …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978149

Political Connections and Firms : Network Dimensions

Bussolo, Maurizio - 2018

Business and politician interaction is pervasive but has mostly been analysed with a binary approach. Yet the network dimensions of such connections are ubiquitous. We use a unique dataset for seven economies that documents politically exposed persons (PEPs) and their links to companies,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919511

Bureaucratic Rents and Life Satisfaction

Lüchinger, Simon; Meier, Stephan; Stutzer, Alois - 2021

correlates with perceptions of corruption. We find judicial independence to be of major relevance for a tame bureaucracy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317746

Incentivizing Learning-by-Doing : The Role of Compensation Schemes

Graff Zivin, Joshua - 2019

In this paper, we examine the impact of pay-for-performance incentives on learning-by-doing. We exploit personnel data on fruit pickers paid under two distinct compensation contracts: a standard piece rate plan and a piece rate plan with an extra one-time bonus tied to output. Under the bonus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870161

The Response to Dynamic Incentives in Insurance Contracts with a Deductible : Evidence from a Differences-in-Regression-Discontinuities Design

Klein, Tobias J. - 2020

We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a deductible. Our approach exploits two sources of variation in a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design: deductible contracts reset at the beginning of the year, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837905

Dynamic Contracts and Learning by Doing

Prat, Julien - 2014

This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013058309

Second-Degree Moral Hazard in a Real-World Credence Goods Market

Balafoutas, Loukas - 2014

Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061956

Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty

Prat, Julien - 2010

We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135822

Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope

Roider, Andreas - 2021

This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide effort to increase a project's scope before some later decisions have to be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316757