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Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection : The Theory and its Application to Ontario

Kantarevic, Jasmin - 2015

behavior. These features include: (1) physicians can choose a payment contract from a menu that includes an enhanced fee …-for-service contract and a blended capitation contract; (2) the capitation rate is higher and the cost-reimbursement rate is lower in the … blended capitation contract; (3) physicians sort selectively into the contracts based on their preferences; and (4) physicians …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016351

Bonus Culture : Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083378

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; Klaauw, Bas van der - 2021

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324973

Double-Sided Moral Hazard in Job Displacement Insurance Contracts

Parsons, Donald O. - 2014

Job displacement insurance typically includes both unemployment benefits and lump-sum severance pay, and each has provoked policy concerns. Unemployment insurance concerns have centered on distorted job search/offer acceptance decisions by the worker, severance-induced firing cost concerns on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067317

The Response to Dynamic Incentives in Insurance Contracts with a Deductible : Evidence from a Differences-in-Regression-Discontinuities Design

Klein, Tobias J. - 2020

We develop a new approach to quantify how patients respond to dynamic incentives in health insurance contracts with a deductible. Our approach exploits two sources of variation in a differences-in-regression-discontinuities design: deductible contracts reset at the beginning of the year, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837905

The Role of Sickness in the Evaluation of Job Search Assistance and Sanctions

van den Berg, Gerard J. - 2016

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001341

The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits : Theory and Evidence from Sweden

Kolsrud, Jonas - 2019

This paper provides a simple, yet general framework to analyze the optimal time profile of benefits during the unemployment spell. We derive simple sufficient-statistics formulae capturing the insurance value and incentive costs of unemployment benefits paid at different times during the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904023

Workers' Moral Hazard and Insurer Effort in Disability Insurance

Koning, Pierre; Lent, Max - 2022

Disability Insurance (DI) may affect workers' outcomes such as their probability to enter DI, to recover, and their employment. Supplementary insurance may increase these moral hazard effects, but also increases the financial gains of private insurers to reduce benefit costs. With increased...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014030828

The Dilemma of Delegating Search : Budgeting in Public Employment Services

Addison, John T. - 2010

The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138264

Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141421