Similar Search Results

Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2010

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135820

Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141421

Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment

Rosaz, Julie - 2011

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers' performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121746

Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory : Evidence from Managers

Huffman, David; Raymond, Collin; Shvets, Julia - 2023

A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using reduced form and structural methods we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014346986

Testing Canonical Tournament Theory : On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure

Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2012

We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111204

Resource Allocation and Firm Scope

Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - 2021

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317478

Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317592

Information Provision, Incentives, and Attention : A Field Experiment on Facilitating and Influencing Managers' Decisions

Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo - 2021

behavior through incentives. We study the impact of these two roles of information on profits by implementing a field …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238644

Differentiation and Performance : An Empirical Investigation on the Incentive Effects of Bonus Plans

Kampkötter, Patrick - 2011

in a simple model that the perceived degree of past differentiation affects future incentives. We then study the impact …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118767

Lying and Team Incentives

Conrads, Julian - 2011

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on … pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120402