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Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy

Bertola, Giuseppe - 2013

with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then … standard functional form restrictions ensure that individual objective functions are optimized by an effort and insurance … combination that is unique and satisfies first- and second-order conditions. Modeling insurance incompleteness in terms of costly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071425

Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141421

Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2010

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135820

Risk and Saving in Two-Person Households : More Scope for Precautionary Saving

Apps, Patricia - 2012

The existing literature suggests that when the saving decision of two-earner households under risk is analysed, standard results on the existence of precautionary saving no longer apply: precautionary saving is obtained if and only if very stringent conditions hold. This paper shows that when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099761

Image Versus Information : Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy

Ali, S. Nageeb - 2016

We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster virtuous behavior. A Principal seeks to motivate reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public-spiritedness, private signal about the value of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990864

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe - 2010

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non …-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private … of insurance on unobservable effort and saving choices as well as the relative cost of public and private insurance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137517

Information and Competition Entry

Ewers, Mara - 2012

This paper studies the influence of information on entry choices in a competition with a controlled laboratory experiment. We investigate whether information provision attracts mainly high productivity individuals and reduces competition failure, where competition failure occurs when a subject...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108628

You Don't Always Get What You Pay For

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775692

Job Assignments Under Moral Hazard : The Peter Principle Revisited

Koch, Alexander K. - 2008

The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often place employees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second, demotions are extremely rare. Why do organizations not correct 'wrong' promotion decision? This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773414

Second-Degree Moral Hazard in a Real-World Credence Goods Market

Balafoutas, Loukas - 2014

Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061956