effects on strike incidence. This ambiguity may explain why higher strike costs need not always lead to fewer strikes, and … incidence data. Although couched in terms of strikes, the results are equally applicable to other negotiation situations …

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options …

function can be explained by Nash bargaining between workers and employers. Under fairly mild assumptions, Nash bargaining … exceed the wage reward. This paper reviews the established empirical regularities and then provides Nash bargaining results …

bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the … help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the …

We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all …

-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm …/methodological viewpoint, we extend a somewhat flexible search-matching economy to alternative bargaining solutions. In particular, we prove … search-matching economies. Second, our results show that even though the traditional results of bargaining theory apply in …

In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength … rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …

We model the bargaining process of parents over custody at the time of divorce. First we assume an institutional …

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is … Nash bargaining solution, we investigate the empirical content of this assumption. We first show that in the most general … does not influence the utility or the threat point of player j ≠ i, then Nash bargaining generates strong testable …