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Learning from a Piece of Pie : The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining

Chiappori, Pierre-André; Donni, Olivier - 2021

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317590

Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm Matching Model?

L'Haridon, Olivier - 2010

's matching model of unemployment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt that has been made to implement and … systematically compare these solutions in search-matching economies. Our results are twofold. First from the theoretical …/methodological viewpoint, we extend a somewhat flexible search-matching economy to alternative bargaining solutions. In particular, we prove …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138265

Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options

Hennig‐Schmidt, Heike - 2013

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074889

Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off : An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea - 2021

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324860

Collective Bargaining Under Non-Binding Contracts

Dobbelaere, Sabien - 2014

We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068560

Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination : Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

Feri, Francesco; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sutter, Matthias - 2021

The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision-making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324929

Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination - Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

Feri, Francesco - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723003

The Empirical Content of Marital Surplus in Matching Models

Doorley, Karina - 2018

well-being and separation. We first estimate the marital surplus using a simple matching model of the marriage market with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012910735

Canonical Correlation and Assortative Matching : A Remark

Dupuy, Arnaud - 2012

In the context of the Beckerian theory of marriage, when men and women match on a single-dimensional index that is the weighted sum of their respective multivariate attributes, many papers in the literature have used linear canonical correlation, and related techniques, in order to estimate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098825

Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity : The Role of Moral Hazard

Costain, James - 2009

This paper studies the cyclical dynamics of Mortensen and Pissarides' (1994) model of job creation and destruction when workers' effort is not perfectly observable, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). An occasionally-binding no-shirking constraint truncates the real wage distribution from below,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157042