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We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074889
We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011168
In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength … rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118529
We report the results of a field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780543
The "joint costs" model states that the incentive to strike is inversely related to the total costs associated with workers' and firms' strike activities. Not only has this model been tested with mixed results, but also the joint costs model is problematic in explaining several stylized facts in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012957490
The labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are … wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports … an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318248
We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find that heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014078209
In an experiment on the repeated prisoner s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a determinant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083911
Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012908872
This paper presents a Schelling-type checkerboard model of residential segregation formulated as a spatial game. It shows that although every agent prefers to live in a mixed-race neighborhood, complete segregation is observed almost all of the time. A concept of tipping is rigorously defined,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155581