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Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off : An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea - 2021

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324860

Treating Equals Unequally : Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology

Goerg, Sebastian J. - 2015

The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012749898

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2013

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087422

Improving the Allocation of Spots in Child Care Facilities for Toddlers in Germany : A Mechanism Design Approach

Carlsson, Sissa - 2015

supervision for about four hours per day. Nevertheless, the stressed situation of matching demand and supply does not only result …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023771

The Illusion of School Choice : Empirical Evidence from Barcelona

Calsamiglia, Caterina - 2014

School choice aims to improve (1) the matching between children and schools and (2) students' educational outcomes. Yet … priorities: (1) the gains in terms of matching seem limited, because the equilibrium allocation is not very different from a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053517

Hiring Through Referrals in a Labor Market with Adverse Selection

Dariel, Aurelie - 2019

Information asymmetries can prevent markets from operating efficiently. An important example is the labor market, where employers face uncertainty about the productivity of job candidates. We examine theoretically and with laboratory experiments three key questions related to hiring via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870195

Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims : Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations

Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - 2021

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319305

Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining

Conrads, Julian - 2011

In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118529

The Efficient and Fair Approval of Multiple-Cost - Single-Benefit Projects Under Unilateral Information

Kahana, Nava - 2009

This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost-single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159507

Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation

Cai, Xiaoming - 2016

In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990861