Showing 1 - 10 of 2,169
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We … show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the … degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780020
Using a negatively framed public good game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930960
. Our results are consistent with the theory of strategic ambiguity of Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and can be rationalized …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316957
goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a … when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857834
This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082165
total factor productivity. We provide empirical evidence in line with the predictions of our theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012923240
We develop a formula for the optimal size of a joint savings association between individuals who share the same financial goal and who can save towards that goal at the same rate. Our motivating example and the core of our analysis is a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA). We measure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081869
The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084675
The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms – which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047854
We report the results of a field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780543