We show theoretically that when larger firms pay higher wages and are more likely to becaught defaulting on labour taxes, then large high-wage firms will be in the formal sector andsmall low-wage firms will be in the informal sector...

We analyze optimal taxation in an economy with monopsonistic labor markets. Theindividuals, whose only decisions are whether to work, or not, have heterogeneousproductivities and opportunity costs of work. Given its preferences for redistribution, thegovernment, which does not observe the...

This paper applies recent advances in the study of labor market dynamics to a representativedeveloping country with a large unregulated of “informal” sector. It confirms the relevance ofthe recent mainstream models and debates surrounding gross worker flows to the developingcountry context,...

Understanding the selection of workers into informality is a policy priority to design programs to increase formalization across Sub-Saharan Africa, where nine out of ten workers are informal. This paper estimates a model of self-selection with entry barriers into the formal sector to identify...

The issue of employer power is underemphasized in the development literature. The default model is usually one of competitive labor markets. This assumption matters for analysis and policy prescription. There is growing evidence that the competitive labor markets assump- tion is not valid for...

This paper shows that self-employment opportunities shape the market power of employers in low-income countries, with implications for industrial development. Using data from Peru, we document substantial employer concentration and high self-employment rates across manufacturing local labor...

Temporary employment contracts are often regarded as 'stepping stones' for workers' careers, because they can help inexperienced workers secure a permanent contract. Our study evaluates whether this stepping-stone function is moderated by the contract duration, exploiting a Dutch policy reform...

Firms frequently provide general skill training to workers at the firm's cost. Theories proposed that labor market frictions entails wage compression, larger productivity gain than wage growth to skill acquisition, and motivates a firm to offer opportunities for skill acquisition, but few...

When employers face a trade-off between growing large and paying low wages that is, when they have monopsony power some productive employers will decide to acquire fewer customers, forgo sales, and remain small. These decisions have adverse consequences for aggregate labor productivity. Using...

We investigate the impact of labour market concentration on two dimensions of job quality, namely wages and job security. We leverage rich administrative linked employer-employee data from Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain in the 2010s to provide the first comparable...