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Repayment Versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts

Bougheas, Spiros P. - 2010

Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action ('investment'). We build an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149943

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Charness, Gary; Kuhn, Peter Joseph; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2021

The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324885

Time is on My Side : Relational Contracts and Aggregate Welfare

Kukharskyy, Bohdan - 2018

total factor productivity. We provide empirical evidence in line with the predictions of our theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012923240

Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment : Thirty Years on

MacLeod, William Bentley; Malcomson, James M. - 2023

with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254947

Free-Riding and Knowledge Spillovers in Teams : The Role of Social Ties

De Paola, Maria - 2016

We investigate whether and how social ties affect performance in teams by implementing a field experiment in which a sample of undergraduate students are randomly assigned to either teams composed by friends or teams composed by individuals not linked by friendship relationships. Students...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012981511

Aligning Ambition and Incentives

Koch, Alexander K.; Peyrache, Eloic - 2021

Labor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate employees in addition to the short term monetary incentives provided by the current employer. We analyze how these incentives interact and derive implications for the design of incentive contracts and organizational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318646

Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending : Theory and Empirical Evidence

Marchesi, Silvia - 2014

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the … information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the … the countries' authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750944

Reputation and Credit Market Formation : How Relational Incentives and Legal Contract Enforcement Interact

Fehr, Ernst - 2009

The evidence suggests that relational contracting and legal rules play an important role in credit markets but on the basis of the prevailing field data it is difficult to pin down their causal impact. Here we show experimentally that relational incentives are a powerful causal determinant for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157034

Reputation vs Selection Effects in Markets with Informational Asymmetries

Alysandratos, Theodore; Geōrganas, Sōtērēs; Sutter, … - 2022

In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014242288

Asymmetric Information in the Labor Market, Immigrants and Contract Menu

Kar, Saibal - 2011

of labor migration, only a handful discusses asymmetric information across transnational labor markets despite agreement … this phenomenon based on asymmetric information in the host country labor market. We focus on the design of a contract menu …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013129911