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Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317592

Supervisors and Performance Management Systems

Frederiksen, Anders - 2017

Supervisors occupy central roles in production and performance monitoring. We study how heterogeneity in performance evaluations across supervisors affects employee and supervisor careers and firm outcomes using data on the performance system of a Scandinavian service sector firm. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012957486

Exploitation Aversion : When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2013

rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078830

Performance Pay, Sorting, and Outsourcing

Henneberger, Fred - 2009

Implementing performance pay requires that workers' output be measured. When measurement costs differ among firms, those with a measurement cost advantage choose to implement performance pay. They attract the best workers, and both the level and variability of compensation are higher at these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012767005

Subjective Performance Evaluation and Inequality Aversion

Grund, Christian; Przemeck, Judith - 2021

Many firms use subjective performance appraisal systems due to lack of objective performance measures. In these cases, supervisors usually have to rate the performance of their subordinates. Using such systems, it is a well established fact that many supervisors tend to assess the employees too...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324841

How Unjust! An Experimental Investigation of Supervisors' Evaluation Errors and Agents' Incentives

Marchegiani, Lucia - 2012

In our simple model the supervisor: i) cannot observe the agent's effort; ii) aims at inducing the agent to exert high effort; but iii) can only offer rewards based on performance. Since performance is only stochastically related to effort, evaluation errors may occur. In particular, deserving...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112772

Self-Confidence and Reactions to Subjective Performance Evaluations

Bellemare, Charles - 2019

Subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to provide feedback and incentives to workers. However, such evaluations can generate significant disagreements and conflicts, the severity of which may be driven by many factors. In this paper we show that a workers' level of self-confidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870269

Turning Relative Deprivation into a Performance Incentive Device

Stark, Oded; Kosiorowski, Grzegorz - 2021

The inclination of individuals to improve their performance when it lags behind that of others with whom they naturally compare themselves can be harnessed to optimize the individuals' effort in work and study. In a given set of individuals, we characterize each individual by his relative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250257

The 'Sales Agent' Problem : Effort Choice Under Performance Pay as Behavior Toward Risk

Zubanov, Nikolay - 2017

We present a model and an experiment that show, in a very general setting, that effort choice under a given linear pay-for-performance contract depends on how the financial risk associated with the scheme interacts with effort. We find that, under a given contract, if risk increases with effort,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962312

Dynamic Incentive Effects of Relative Performance Pay : A Field Experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse - 2013

performance of the treatment stores. As predicted by theory, we find that treatment stores that lag far behind do not respond to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074203