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Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy

Bertola, Giuseppe - 2013

We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071425

Do Environmental Regulations Effect FDI Decisions? The Pollution Haven Hypothesis Revisited

Yoon, Haeyeon - 2017

In an attempt to verify the pollution haven hypothesis, this study investigates the impact of environmental regulations … the host country's environmental regulations. Since the pollution haven's effects indicate moving the polluting production … those countries. This supports the prevalence of the effects of pollution havens. However, before we separate the FDI into …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950905

Three New Empirical Tests of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis When Environmental Regulation is Endogenous

Millimet, Daniel L. - 2014

The validity of existing empirical tests of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) is constantly under scrutiny due to … environmental regulation on inbound FDI in pollution-intensive sectors, particularly when measured by employment, and (iii) larger …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067531

Why is Pollution from U.S. Manufacturing Declining? The Roles of Trade, Regulation, Productivity, and Preferences

Shapiro, Joseph S. - 2015

, environmental regulation, productivity, and consumer preferences have contributed to these reductions in pollution emissions. We … estimate the model's key parameters using administrative data on plant-level production and pollution decisions. We then … pollution changes. Finally, we compare the model-driven decomposition to a statistical decomposition. The model and data suggest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029138

The Role of Sickness in the Evaluation of Job Search Assistance and Sanctions

van den Berg, Gerard J. - 2016

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001341

The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits : Theory and Evidence from Sweden

Kolsrud, Jonas - 2019

This paper provides a simple, yet general framework to analyze the optimal time profile of benefits during the unemployment spell. We derive simple sufficient-statistics formulae capturing the insurance value and incentive costs of unemployment benefits paid at different times during the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904023

Workers' Moral Hazard and Insurer Effort in Disability Insurance

Koning, Pierre; Lent, Max - 2022

Disability Insurance (DI) may affect workers' outcomes such as their probability to enter DI, to recover, and their employment. Supplementary insurance may increase these moral hazard effects, but also increases the financial gains of private insurers to reduce benefit costs. With increased...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014030828

The Dilemma of Delegating Search : Budgeting in Public Employment Services

Addison, John T. - 2010

The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138264

Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141421

Severance Pay Mandates : Firing Costs, Hiring Costs, and Firm Avoidance Behaviors

Parsons, Donald O. - 2011

The potentially adverse labor market effects of severance pay mandates are a continuing source of policy concern. In a seminal study, Lazear (1990) found that contract avoidance of severance pay firing costs was theoretically simple – a bonding scheme would do – but that empirically the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121754