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Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On

MacLeod, W. Bentley; Malcomson, James - 2023

"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014296625

Resource allocation and firm scope

Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - 2006

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268001

Resource Allocation and Firm Scope

Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761852

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Charness, Gary; Kuhn, Peter J.; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233858

The Adverse Consequences of Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

De Paola, Maria; Gioia, Francesca; Scoppa, Vincenzo - 2016

We run a field experiment to investigate whether competing in rank-order tournaments with different prize spreads affects individual performance. Our experiment involved students from an Italian University who took an intermediate exam in which one part was awarded on the basis of their relative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479372

On the sorting of physicians across medical occupations

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - 2008

less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269167

On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703622

It Hurts to Ask

Benabou, Roland; Jaroszewicz, Ania; Loewenstein, George - 2022

We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013426425

Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract

Roider, Andreas - 2004

The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262045

Contracting with Private Information

Hagedorn, Marcus - 2003

and Moore still hold. It is shown that investment incentives are guided by an additional element to standard hold … overinvestment. Although investment incentives are always positive from a social perspective, they can be negative from an individual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262108