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Competing on the Holodeck: The Effect of Virtual Peers and Heterogeneity in Dynamic Tournaments

Graff, Frederik; Grund, Christian; Harbring, Christine - 2018

tournament in VR, we are able to mitigate the reflection problem, which usually undermines research on dynamic interaction … output. We observe that the subjects' performance is highest in a homogeneous tournament, i.e., when they compete against an … peer effects rather than by tournament incentives. We extensively track the behavior of subjects and the particular …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011984479

Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … effects in the piece-rate pay scheme. In contrast, in the tournament scheme we find some evidence of positive peer effects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703358

Reward or Punishment? The Distribution of Life-Cycle Returns to Political Office

Dahlgaard, Jens Olav; Kristensen, Nicolai; Larsen, … - 2022

How political office is remunerated will affect who decides to engage in politics. Even if average returns to office are positive, as unilaterally found in the literature, some office holders' returns are likely zero or negative. The timing of returns to office are crucial too, as politicians...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013351813

?Atypical Work? and Compensation

Addison, John T.; Surfield, Christopher J. - 2005

Atypical work, or alternative work arrangements in U.S. parlance, has long been criticized for providing poorly-compensated employment. Although one group of atypical workers (contractors) seems to enjoy a wage premium, our cross-section results from the CPS and NLSY for the better-known...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262200

‘Atypical Work’ and Compensation

Addison, John T.; Surfield, Christopher J. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822633

Feedback and incentives: experimental evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268675

Potential, prizes and performance : testing tournament theory with professional tennis data

Sunde, Uwe - 2003

This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been tested empirically before; and (ii) whether incentives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261647

Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2004

Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262080

Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2006

. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267611

Performance pay and multi-dimensional sorting: productivity, preferences and gender

Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin - 2006

. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is either a piece rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We elicit … findings are as follows. First, output is much higher in the variable pay schemes (piece rate, tournament, and revenue sharing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267618