conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We … consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns …) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted …

We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an … world. We characterize the optimal delegation schemes for all discount rates and show that they resemble organizational … arrangements that are commonly observed, including centralization and threshold delegation. For small biases threshold delegation …

case of delegation. On the other hand, any acquired information is better aggregated in case of delegation, where experts …

We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an … world. We characterize the optimal delegation schemes for all discount rates and show that they resemble organizational … arrangements that are commonly observed, including centralization and threshold delegation. For small biases threshold delegation …

exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that only if exogenous risk is sufficiently large, the risk-neutral principal …

conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We … consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns …) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted …