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This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267674
This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233793
This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277255
We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261611
We show experimentally that a principal?s distrust in the voluntary performance of an agent has a negative impact on the agent?s motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides whether he wants to restrict the agents? choice set by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261958
To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns arise. These can both be 'good' (enhancing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271239
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)'s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282296
We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 (?Pre-Bosman? or P), currently in use (?Bosman? or B), and recently approved (?Monti? or M) differ with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262824
We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268857
The evidence suggests that relational contracting and legal rules play an important role in credit markets but on the basis of the prevailing field data it is difficult to pin down their causal impact. Here we show experimentally that relational incentives are a powerful causal determinant for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269410