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Sabotage in tournaments: evidence from a laboratory experiment

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2009

Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage … behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm … one of the key insights from theory: effort and sabotage increase with the wage spread. Additionally, we find that even in …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010268946

Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10004980267

Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2004

competition between agents but also by the possibility to punish the principal via sabotage. … competitors in order to improve the own relative position. In the present study we investigate whether this sabotage problem is … mitigated in a repeated interaction between the agents and the principal. As sabotage can hardly be observed in real …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010262080

Managerial incentives and favoritism in promotion decisions: Theory and field evidence

Berger, Johannes; Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk - 2011

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010278492

Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010267611

Helping in Teams

Danilov, Anastasia; Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2014

We study, how help can be fostered under relative rewards by means of team bonus and corporate value statements. A simple model analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. As one potential measure to encourage help, we augment relative rewards with team rewards...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010481598

Helping under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives

Danilov, Anastasia; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Harbring, Christine - 2019

we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012005968

Incentives for Cooperation in Teams: Sociality Meets Decision Rights

Butz, Britta; Guillén, Pablo; Harbring, Christine - 2021

We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of the donation to be made. An up to 20 % donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment,...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012597388

Helping in Teams

Danilov, Anastasia; Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011105057

Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Ruchala, Gabriele K. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

bonus is substantial. In this case, however, the data suggests that tournament competition crowds out voluntary cooperation …

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005233887