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Vote Influence in Group Decision-Making: The Changing Role of Justices' Peers on the Supreme Court

Mindock, Maxwell R.; Waddell, Glen R. - 2019

We consider the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices, finding evidence of co-dependencies in their votes. Coincident with changes in the party imbalance of the Court over time, sharp discontinuities in these dependencies are evident. Overall, the patterns suggest a tradeoff between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012006017

Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Bortolotti, Stefania; Parisi, Francesco; … - 2024

Rational parties enter into a contract if the agreement is mutually beneficial. However, after the contract is formed, changes to the costs and/or benefits of performance may render the original contract undesirable. In this paper, we carry out an incentivized experiment to study the effect of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015097110

Divorce and the Excess Burden of Lawyers

Halla, Martin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

We present a model where divorcing spouses can choose to hire lawyers in their divorce process. Spouses encounter incentives as in the classical prisoners’ dilemma: Despite the zero sum nature of the game and the lawyers’ fees, each spouse has an incentive to hire a lawyer. We propose a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762445

Contracts between legal persons

Kornhauser, Lewis A.; MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2010

Contract law and the economics of contract have, for the most part, developed independently of each other. In this essay, we briefly review the notion of a contract from the perspective of lawyer, and then use this framework to organize the economics literature on contract. The title, Contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278326

Contracts between Legal Persons

Kornhauser, Lewis A.; MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008765228

Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts

MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2006

This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267674

Do the selfish mimic cooperators? Experimental evidence from finitely-repeated labor markets

Roe, Brian E.; Wu, Steven Y. - 2009

outcomes are justified by existing reputation building models, which suggest that cooperative outcomes can be sustained if some …) selfish players mimic the actions of cooperators when trading partners can track the individual reputation of past partners …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269268

Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market

Benson, Alan; Sojourner, Aaron J.; Umyarov, Akhmed - 2015

In two experiments, we examine the effects of employer reputation in an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) in … reputation, we find that good-reputation employers attract work of the same quality but at twice the rate as bad-reputation … employers. This is the first clean, field evidence on the value of employer reputation. It can serve as collateral against …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401783

Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts

MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233793

Do the Selfish Mimic Cooperators? Experimental Evidence from Finitely-Repeated Labor Markets

Roe, Brian E.; Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566817