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Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Bortolotti, Stefania; Parisi, Francesco; … - 2024

Rational parties enter into a contract if the agreement is mutually beneficial. However, after the contract is formed, changes to the costs and/or benefits of performance may render the original contract undesirable. In this paper, we carry out an incentivized experiment to study the effect of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015097110

Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives

Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - 2009

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269508

Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - 2010

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269520

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506073

Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives

Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008527309

Worker Self-Selection and the Profits from Cooperation

Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822981

Knowing What Works The Case for Rigorous Program Evaluation

Schmidt, Christoph M. - 1999

problem. It introduces several approaches, based on both experiments and on non-experimental data, that have been proposed in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262297

Evaluating Environmental Programs: The Perspective of Modern Evaluation Research

Frondel, Manuel; Schmidt, Christoph M. - 2001

when controlled experiments are not a viable option, appropriate approaches might succeed where traditional empirical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262600

Did we overestimate the role of social preferences? The case of self-selected student samples

Falk, Armin; Meier, Stephan; Zehnder, Christian - 2011

foundation of social preferences is largely based on laboratory experiments with self-selected students as participants. This is … potentially problematic as students participating in experiments may behave systematically different than non …-participating students or non-students. In this paper we empirically investigate whether laboratory experiments with student samples …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274687

Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Gächter, Simon; Renner, Elke - 2014

We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people's behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435289